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4. The Enlightenment Again Under Attack
Abstract

Until recently, and especially in the United States, Western Civilization has been dominated by Enlightenment
thought, tempered by the criticisms of the nineteenth century. One of the current questions is whether this
strand of thought is adequate to cope with the problems of the age of anxiety. Those who believe that the
Enlightenment ideas are still basically sound suggest the giving up of transcendent or long-term goals in favor
of more immediate aims. Equality and freedom are, in such a context better when they apply to more people
than when they apply to fewer. According to this way of thinking, one interpretation of justice would be better
than another if it could be realized by more people. That type of security is better which more people can
enjoy. Thus the Enlightenment concepts are dealt with less qualitatively than quantitatively. [excerpt]
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4.

Tbe Enlightenment Again Under Attack

Until
and L-^^.por.i ally in -fr.ht^ TTnyj-q.;^. .'nates. Western
Civilisation has been dominated bv Enl iaiitcmnenttb^'tiriTiF"''
I'titl
the crrtrcTsins"of the nineteenth centuryT^OnF~oT the current
qiiestions""is~wEeth'er this strand of thoiight is adequate to cope
with the problems of the ar;e of amiiety. Those who believe that
the Enlightenineat ideas are still basically scu.nd sug^ st the
ii'ivine up of transcendent or lone-tern goals la favor cf Eicro
iEicediate aims. Equality and freedon are, in such a contest,
better when they apply to more people than when they apply to
fewer. According to this way of thinking, one interpretation of
justice would be bettex- than another if it could be realir^ed by
i;:ore people. That typo of security is better which noro people
can enjoy. Thus
._gnlii::htenaent concepts are dealt with less
qualitatively than
—
This approach has certain obvious siorits.

It, dees, avoid the

fin^ine with the iinlichtennGnt demand for an empirical approach to
all problei£S. And, it includes our traditional GHPhnn-iR nn
Gupreuacy of the individual., with his rir:ht to pass judginent on all
icieaio ana values before giving then his allegiance. And finally
it offers an interpretation which is potentially universal i^i its
applicability. It can be used to include all ivien on the face of
the earth, or even oa planets yet to be visited. But, despite
these advanta.-:ies, this a-prjroach has certain serious shortcoKiinr:s
when aa.;,}] ind
tY/oaJilglk-Xmifcux .
to_be raised concerning the adequacy
of the Enlightenraent-liberal tradition today focuses on the difference between contenporary society and that of the eir:hte5R'gh
century. In the eax-lier perio3~~Sen^/ere breaking out of a society
dominated by absolutism and establishing their freedoKi fron its
restrictions. Biit the Industrial Revolution created a situation
foi" which the SnlightenEient picture v/as no longer true. Fcr some
people, such as the I.;ai-;iists, changing econonic conditions neant
that nan has also lost his political independence. But for others
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the Enlightenment insistence on man's political and moral
independence still stood as a bulwark against this interpretation.
However, the defense of laissez-faire became increasingly hard.
Man's economic choices, to say nothing about his political and
moral choices, are just not as free as they once were.
A -SQ-eead-niie-s-tinn that is raised concerning
adogii-npy nf
the Enlightenment focuses qjo, the earliex,.period's.chQi-c^"'«^---valiies.
Critical though it was of ail absolutes, the Enl i p-htpriment
emphaaizeri
values as liberty and equality. Hov/ever, as
some thinkers have pointed out, these two values are not unrelated
to the third value of fraternity. Liberty v/ithout fraternity^
becomes license; and equality withoTiT''Tra^"ernrtY^
1 rrqsDonsibility.- WhlTe no libeFal wouTS" v/T^h to re
to an inter
pretation which makes freedom and equality depend on fraternity
(something which would make the individual a mere function of
the polis, class, nation, or race), he is nevertheless faced with
his greater interdependence on others today. Re. is forced-^^'to
recognizetheclaims of the social as well as the individual
valueig. And his choice is not so much betweeiriblie "individual
and the social values as it is betv/een the kinds of social values
which he must choose.
These claims are todav nf such importance for some people
that they are demanding a realignment of our
vainF- p-tyiinture.
ThSy ask how we can judge productive efficiency in terms of freedom
or equality, and evince a sincere desire to have some positive
standard by means of which the individual can pass a realistic
judgment on the huge institutions of his time. Such a demand can
only be countered by referring to the "people" and by saying that
this is not what the people really want. However, if this is what
some people sincerely want, there might come a time when a majority
would wish this, and then we might be faced with a situation in
which a majority democratically called for undemocratic values to
be established. Or, we might have a situation in which a majority
freely voted to deprive themselves of freedom. The most recent
example of this is to be found in Hitler's continuance in power
upon the votes of the German people. The very possibility of such
a situation anyv/here in Western Civilization raises serious
questions about the purely quantitative approach to values.
A_J:hird question raised about the quantitative approach con
cerns its adequacy when making distinctions among valueg. especially
in such a complex_sqcietx,,..a
is.Joda^ Both the Enl i phtanment
and liberalism shared a noramnn enmity to absolutism in all it.a fn-rmH,
and, as a consequence, a common program: the promotion of fx.aedom.
As long as"this was a major objective, it was possible to think
mainly in terms of the extent of a single value. Liberalism meant
more freedom for more people in an increasing number of areas of
life; religion, politics, economics, and culture in general. But
today, when the critical v/ork has largely been done, and the con
struction of a new type of society is well under v/ay, man is faced
\?ith a choice. Is liberty more important than security? Is politics
more important than economics? Is efficiency more important than

XIX

p. 17

individuality? Is ethics more important than economics, or than
politics? To answer these questions, a purely numerical approach
breaks down. How can we settle these questions in terms of the
number of people who would be free and the number who would be
secure? Some other type of standard is demanded, one which will
enable us to put our several values in order of priority and then
decide among them,
A fourth nuestion follows hard upon the heels of this last
one. ^~Tt i§__P£L-Qe.w auction. bujtlxllSi'r one..^mtoch>Jaaa»Jj^ea^^
e^7gT'~~sTnca-ltbtj)•
Is it
po^i HT^ t.n aT-T"ivP> n,t an i riptal and tl33 sense of obligation which

approacft? The Enlig1iiu»^mfHT4?--4-r>«4 s;tpd that t.bp only way msju-cou1d
irnow that any^-hi-iag^.^ua.g.--dfa^iT-ahiroag fyriTO tliT fnct that thry fiifl
desire it. Any other approach seemed to them to be nothing more
than a return to some form of absolutism. Kant's criticism that
it v/as impossible to arrive at an ought by piling up any number of
ises went to the heart of this question. His shifting of the
basis of attack from the problem of knowing to that of acting
opened up the new lines which we have been following. But the
chain of events which followed Kant, represented by men such as
Hegel and Bismarck, only served to substantiate the Enlightenraent
belief that any way other than its own represented a return to
absolutism. More recently, however, students of history and politics
have raised the question whether the matter is as uncomplicated
as a simple choice betv/een freedom and authority. They have pointed
out, as did Burke, that the French Revolution, v/hich follov/ed the
ideas of the Enlightenment, became just as authoritarian as any
other political movement. These tnore rprr-nt. nnnlxses ham-SnggoRtcd
that man,
ajUga-ygj had some ought or standard of obligation above
iTis empirical existence, that thR Knl i p-htennen^. picture of man as
completely free to choose among v'arious
r ivnr. nnT-oai i c!ti <?,
^nd'tiie question, at least nov/, is not v^heiJifij:, or not to have-ajay
ideals, | 5 T r r " f 5 i T r F i p r ~ w K T r t i .
This need •Fy'' wnmp
n-f tp
anH
bfi
in
numlnir nf nrnaTi nf h-min PYlst.ennfi
o-f +hp
most sigiTiT-,n-ir.n- innp-n^|TA, thought • and grammar, If, for
example, we wish to make a comparative statement, the—niilas__Q£
g;rammar force
c>inpl r»y a reference to something whi r.h i w j t...
self not rp-laJiijup-• If v/e wish to say that something is more (big
ger, faster), we are required to say more than something else. Our
English teachers insist that when we compare we must compare one
thing v/ith something else. So we say: He is taller than she, or
he is taller than he was a year ago. We find the same problem
when we try to graph the path of a planet. Axes must be set up to
give us the frame of reference within which we can draw a line
which will have meaning. Even when v/e set up a scientific experi
ment we must have a point of reference as our control. This helps
explain why some thinkers are trying to construct a language of
words or mathematical symbols in v/hich such static references will
no longer be necessary. But, for the present time at least, v/e
seem to be faced with the need for some standard in order to vinder-
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stand our experiences, whether they be scientific or social, and
to express the results of those experiences meaningfully in terms
acceptable to the demands of thought and grammar.
Thorft 1!^ n"e final problem which has appeared recently among
pr.yr.hn1 nglatsB...and--4m4-rby4a|iQlQgists~ Th¥~psycSolbgists have for
some time agreaxi...that.^ .a person enl^Srygr:araamifc
personaliiy
If he tries J;^1-_£q11ow a consisteat value system whichItn^daa^a
riAf i ni te p-ri n-ri ty
AntJirQPQlogists have discovej^ed that the same
thing hQXd£LJu:uia.._Jtor---3ghole cultures, even thpugK" cuIT:ufeg~may
diiier™X-ad±caLly„amoixg„-tJiemiSjelYes,» And this means that the more
closely knit ourjQulture becomes^ the better it will be if it has
a~"yaTug^^^
and further, that tHe happier we w^^
if we can
find Itj, But, if valufis.-.liajze.^iux reali.tv. or refir to no reality,
then serious probXems-ane raised. The moral problem has been
raised by those sociologists who ask how an anthropologist can
disbelieve in the reality of values, while at the same time either
recognizing the need fpr them if a culture is to be intelligible
or recommending them to a culture for its improvement. A meta
physical problem appears when we ask how it is that such nonreal
values can work so well, or why a culture's refusal to accept them
brings disastrous results.
The demand that we make mir cultural values absolute in order
to defend them~~againsT~^e powersI-Q^totaIitariaxL-r.niTnl:ri ea
,a1rgxnst~The yery grain of pur_ Enligh^ejmaalL.The demand
that we conform appaa-vR as nothing fin
as t-h^ .imry denial of
p^asT history. Faced with the events of Worl^ Eax-1, th^-poXi^Eiuial
defeats of democracy, and the wnri dwi
depT'eHsinrL^-iJie liberals *
faith was' deejilv-^aiiaken. tfriSeF the3m;^
of these events many" of
them turned to a socialistic interpretation of liberalism by means
of which they hoped to harness and control the economic forces.
For many, especially during the depression years of the thirties,
Russia ^became the great example of this sort of socialism. But
the Iloimgression Pact of 1939 between Russia and Nazi Germany
brought such an interpretation of Communism to an end, as the
purges of 1936-1937 had brought to an end the interpretation of
Communism as a democratic movement. The Spanish Revolution of
1936-1939 appeared to many to be simply another Enlightenment
situation in which free men were rising up against old feudal
absolutisms. But the liberals who joined the Republican forces
soon found themselves the supporters of Communism against the
fascist-backed forces of Spanish conservatism, FinaHx., the
outbrea^jof_WQjridJa3®---tf"in 1939^ seemed to -for^e^ouce-^.agaiii„jtlie
cOiiirrasion that the contempQraxy ,world represented- sot
as aJjaaEi]^^
power, between the great nation-states. The
que"stion was now how tg .aruwaiieseIf against:..SHch J.nstitutions.

